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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PROCEDURES FOR
SEIZURE OF OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS
Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property'

The appellants were five retail newsstand operators and a wholesale distributor
of magazines, all operating in the Kansas City area. In October of 1957, a police
officer was conducting an investigation into the distribution of allegedly obscene
magazines. He visited the appellant-wholesaler's place of business and presented
a list of magazines. The wholesaler admitted that his company distributed all but
one of the magazines. The following day the officer visited the newsstands of the
other appellants and purchased one magazine at each, and the next day he signed
and filed six sworn complaints in the circuit court, stating that of his own knowledge the appellant named therein kept obscene publications for the purpose of sale.
No copy of any magazine on the list, or those purchased by the officer, was shown
to the court.
The circuit judge issued six search warrants to any peace officer in the State
of Missouri to search and seize obscene materials. All warrants were executed
but -by different officers, and the officers, not confining themselves to the original
list, seized all magazines, which in their judgment were obscene. Within three
hours, 11,000 copies of 280 publications were seized. A hearing was held thirteen
days later. Motions were made to quash the warrants and suppress as evidence the
property seized, and to have the property returned, alleging, inter alia, that the
Missouri procedures were invalid under the guarantee of free speech assured against
state abridgment by the fourteenth amendment. The circuit court, in an unreported
opinion two months later, overruled the motions and found 100 of the 280 items
seized to be obscene. The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the validity of the
procedures.2 Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The
Missouri procedures of search for and seizure of obscene material lacked the safeguards which due process demands to assure nonobscene material the constitutional
protection to which it is entitled.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Rot& v. United States3 held that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. In
1. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
2. Search Warrant of Property v. Marcus, 334 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1960) (en
banc).
3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
(501)
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State v. Becker' the Missouri Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of
the penal obscenity statute, 5 stated that it has long been held that freedom of
speech is not an absolute right at all times and under all circumstances but that
it is subject to the state's right to exercise its police power.
The determination of what is obscene is a constitutional issue. The standard
followed until recently was from Regina v. Hicklin,8 in which the court looked
to see if the alleged obscene matter depraved and corrupted those particularly
susceptible persons who read it. The Roth decision rejected Hicklin holding that
the test of obscenity is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
8
to the prurient interest. ' 7 Missouri is cited as a state that uses this standard.
The standard in Roth safeguards "the protectiton of freedom of speech and press
for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to the prurient
interest." 9
The search warrant was much abused in early English and American history,
especially by the use of general warrants. Lord Camden, in the case of Entick v.
0
finally condemned the use of general warrants. Entick brought a
Carrington,'
trespass action against four King's Messengers acting under such a general warrant
for entering his dwelling and searching for and seizing all the books and papers
they could find. The court declared that, regardless of past decisions, the general
warrant was contrary to common law, and expressly dismissed the contention
that it is better to prevent the publication before than to punish afterwards. The
1
United States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States' in a discussion of the
history leading up to the Bill of Rights calls the Entick case a landmark of English
liberty.
The United States Supreme Court held that the procedures used by the
State of Missouri amounted to a "general warrant" in that they did not possess
the safeguards which the Roth case deemed necessary to protect free speech and
press under the fourteenth amendment.12 The Missouri procedures authorized the
4. 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954).
5. § 563.280, RSMo 1959, provides: "Every person who shall manufacture...
offer for sale or advertise for sale, or . . . shall give away, distribute or circulate
any obscene, lewd, licentious, indecent or lascivious book . . . or other publication
of indecent, immoral or scandalous character . . . shall, on conviction thereof . .. ."
This statute was declared unconstitutional in State v. Burton, 349 S.W.2d 228 (Mo.
1961). Senate Bill 194, signed into law July 10, 1961, repealed the statute and
in its place enacted a statute that requires the proscribed acts to be done
"knowingly."

6. [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
7. Roth v. United States, supra note 3, at 489.
8. Id. at 489, n. 26.
9. Id. at 488.
10. 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law......
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issuance of a warrant for search and seizure of obscene publications on the filing
of a sworn complaint stating facts "positively and not upon information or belief,"'"
before a judge or magistrate." There was no hearing before issuance of the warrant but the judge issuing the warrant had to fix a date for a hearing not less
than five days nor more than twenty days after the seizure to determine if
obscene or not.15 The judge was required to order the material he found obscene
burned; no time limit was set for this decision.' 6
The warrants issued here merely restated the broad language of the statutes
and left it up to the officers who carried out the warrants to determine on the
spot what was obscene to them, and what was not obscene. The glaring fact that
almost two-thirds (180) of the materials seized were judged by the circuit court
not to be obscene seems to be conclusive proof, in itself, that the procedures did
not adequately safeguard free speech or press. These nonobscene, constitutionally
protected materials were out of circulation for a period of over two months.
This restraint of freedom cannot be justified by the invocation of the State's
police power, for nonobscene materials are not subject to regulation by that
7
power. The Supreme Court of the United States in Smith. v. California' declared
unconstitutional an ordinance which prohibited any person from having an obscene
book in his possession in a bookshop. The ordinance included no element of
scienter. It imposed strict liability, regardless of knowledge of the contents of the
book. The complete elimination of the scienter requirement conflicted with the
first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution as it might tend to restrict
the freedoms of speech and press. Public access to constitutionally protected
matter would be severely limited because the bookseller would restrict the books
he sold to those he had inspected for fear of criminal liability being imposed
absolutely. The Missouri Supreme Court, in applying the rule in Smith., has found
13. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 33.01, provides for the seizure of personal property where
authorized by statute if the verified complaint filed with the judge or magistrate
states facts positively and not upon information and belief. The complaint and
warrant must contain a description of the personal property in sufficient detail
and particularity to enable the officer serving the warrant to ascertain readily and
identify the same.
14. § 542.380, RSMo 1959, provides that upon a verified complaint a search
warrant may be issued to the sheriff or any constable of the county directing
him to search for and seize: "(2) Any of the following articles, kept for the purpose of being sold, published, exhibited, given away or otherwise distributed or
circulated, viz., obscene, lewd, licentious, indecent or lascivious books, pamphlets,
ballads, papers, drawings . . . or other articles or publications of an indecent,
immoral or scandalous character, or any letters, handbills . .. advertisements or
notices of any kind giving information . . .when, where, how or of whom any
of such things can be obtained ... "

15. § 542.400, RSMo 1959, provides that the judicial officer issuing the warrant
shall set a day not less than five nor more than twenty days after day of seizure,
"for determining whether such property is the kind of property mentioned in section
542.380, and shall order the officer ... to retain possession of the same until after
such hearing."
16. § 542.420, RSMo 1959, provides for destruction of the property or articles
if they are found to be of the kind mentioned in § 542.380 (2).
17. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
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that similar city ordinances's and a state statute 9 were unconstitutional as
they imposed absolute liability without scienter. In Speiser v. Randall" the
United States Supreme Court stated that there is a fine line between unconditionally guaranteed speech and that which may be legitimately regulated, suppressed or punished. "Sensitive tools" are called for to guarantee that protection.
The conclusion drawn in Marcus, that procedures which sweep so broadly and
with so little discrimination are obviously deficient in techniques required by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, seems highly warranted.21
The Missouri Supreme Court considered Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown;2 as
controlling its decision. In Kingsley, where the United States Supreme Court was
dealing with New York procedures, a police officer gave the court copies of the
publication to be restrained and the court could decide whether the material
was obscene or not before issuing the restraining order. The restraints ran only
against the "named" publication. There was no catch-all restraint running to all
obscene material. Free speech and press were further safeguarded by leaving the
materials in the hands of the distributor, removal being the most effective restraint
possible. The distributor could still distribute the materials until hearing, in disobedience of the interim order.23 A judicial decision on the merits was required
within only two days after trial, which, in turn, was required to be one day after
seizure. In contrast, the Missouri procedures did not provide for prior scrutiny
of copies of the alleged obscene material by the court. The Missouri warrants ran
to all obscene materials, not just certain named materials. All copies of the material
were seized and held pending judicial determination, which in effect caused 180
constitutionally protected magazines and books to be withheld from the public
for a period of two months. The Supreme Court of the United States, in holding
that Kingsley did not apply to the present case, stated that the distinction between
the New York procedures2 ' and the Missouri procedures 5 was one of limited
injunctive remedy in the former, and a "scheme" which inhibited indiscriminately
the circulation of publications because of the absence of any safeguards.
The Missouri Supreme Court looked to the character of the property involved
to determine what was reasonable, as it is unreasonable searches that are prohibited

18. City of St. Louis v. Williams, 343 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1961); Kansas City
v. Hammer, 347 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1961).
19. State v. Burton, 349 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1961); see supra note 5.
20. 357 U.S. 513 (1957).
21. Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, supra note 1, at 733.
22. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
23. Id. at 443, n. 2. The Court indicated that the law may be construed as not
imposing punishment for violation of the interim order, where the material after
due trial was found not obscene.
24. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22-a, provides for jurisdiction in the supreme
court to enjoin the sale or distribution of obscene materials, a complaint being filed
and temporary injunction issued, trial on issues in one day, decision in two days;
and if court finds obscene a permanent injunction is issued and an order for
destruction is issued.
25. Supra notes 13-16.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/10
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by the Constitution. 28 In finding the searches and seizures to be reasonable, the
Missouri court decided that obscene goods and materials were illicit wherever
found so that a description would be unnecessary except as to their character,
place and circumstances. 27 Further, the court compared the obscene materials to
unlawful liquor and gambling implements, citing cases where warrants were held
sufficient describing the property merely as "all intoxicating liquors" 28 and "gaming
implements and apparatus." 29 But, obscenity cannot be treated in the same way
as gambling apparatus and liquors. To do so is to beg the question. The latter
do not involve a question of free speech and press which has to be protected by
definite descriptions of the property to be seized so as to safeguard that material
which is not illicit, as it is not obscene. So, even though obscene material is illicit
wherever found, the state procedures for search and seizure must specify the
obscene materials so as to protect nonobscene materials from interference in the
rights of speech and press.
It is clear that obscenity can be regulated by state action. What is obscene
and what is not obsecene is a problem to be decided by the courts and not law
80
enforcement officers. No matter how obscene some of the matters may be, if
the material is seized under warrants that do not distinguish the obscene
materials from the nonobscene materials by adequate safeguards in specification,
the entire action shall fail as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
J xsmrIAH D. FINNEGAN

26. The concurring opinion by Justices Black and Douglas found that the
warrants used made no attempt to describe specifically "the things to be seized"
as the fourth amendment requires. And that, since the fourteenth amendment
makes the fourth amendment applicable to the full extent of its terms to the
states as well as the federal government, these general warrants were unconstitutional.
1 27. 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 73(f) (1952); 47 AM. JUR. Searches and
Seizures § 37 (1943).
28. State v. Cook, 322 Mo. 1203, 18 S.W.2d 58 (1929).
29. Frost v. People, 193 Ill. 635, 61 N.E. 1054 (1901); North v. State, 159
Fla. 854, 32 So. 2d 915 (1947); Cagle v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 354, 180 S.W.2d
928 (1944).
30. "Itisimpossible to adequately describe these exhibits and quite unnecessary. It issufficient to say of them generally that they consist of pictures of young women, naked or nearly so, in suggestive and provocative poses
with emphasis on bust development and lustful entreaty. The legends accompanying the pictures and other printed material add to the prurient interest created.
It is stated on some of the publications that they are for artists and photographers
... .Generally, the technical information on picture taking in these publications
is less than that found on the leaflet in a roll of new film . .

.

. No one can

seriously contend that any great work of art, literature, ideas or information will
be lost to the world if these publications are not disseminated." Search Warrant of
Property v. Marcus, supra note 2, at 126.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A RESTRAINT
ON CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
Wilkinson v. United States'
Petitioner was summoned to testify before a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, which was investigating
Communist infiltration into basic industries in the South and Communist Party
propaganda activities in the South. Petitioner refused to answer a question as to
whether he was then a member of the Communist Party asserting that the questioning by the subcommittee violated his rights under the first amendment. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia convicted
petitioner for refusal to answer questions propounded to him by the subcommittee.2
His conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. 3 The Supreme Court, three
Justices dissenting, affirmed, 4 adopting the reasoning of the Barenblatt v. United
States5 decision which had held that the balance between the individual's rights
under the first amendment and the governmental interests at stake in investigating
communism must be struck in favor of the latter, and that therefore the provisions
of the first amendment had not been offended.
In the decade following World War II, there appeared a new kind of congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history. The principal
factor in this development has been the various investigations into the threat of
subversion of the United States Government. This new phase of legislative inquiry
has involved a broad scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens and
brought before the courts novel questions of the appropriate limits of congressional
inquiry. Difficult problems of balancing the interests of government with the rights
and privileges of individuals have been posed. 6 With the appeal of a witness to
the first amendment as a limitation upon congressional inquiry, the important
issue of the extent of its protection was raised.
The issue first arose in two early cases concerning witnesses who had been
called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and refused to
testify or produce records asserting that the inquiry into their speech and political
activity violated rights protected by the first amendment. In both cases courts of
appeal held that the power of Congress to gather facts of intense public concern
was not diminished by the unchallenged right of individuals to speak their minds
within lawful limits and that there was no violation of the first amendment. It

1. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961). A companion case,
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961), involved substantially the same facts.
2. See 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. 192 (1958).
3. Wilkinson v. United States, 272 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1959).
4. Wilkinson v. United States, supra note 1.
5. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
6. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195 (1957); Summers, The First
Amendment as a Restraint on the Power of Congress to Investigate, 43 MAQ. L.

Rpy. 459, 463 (1960).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/10
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was asserted that the menace of communism justifies congressional inquiry into
7
the subject.
A different result was reached in Rumely v. United States.8 There the court
asserted that the first amendment protected a witness before a House Committee
on Lobbying Activities in refusing to disclose the names and addresses of purchasers of books on national issues when no public necessity, such as a threat to
the security of the country, was involved.
It was not until 1957 that the Supreme Court again considered the relation
of the first amendment claim to congressional investigations. In that year, the
Supreme Court in Watkins v. United States9 reversed a contempt conviction of a
labor organizer who had refused to testify about former associates who might
have been Communist Party members, but who he felt had long since left the
party, when called before the House Un-American Activities Committee. In regard to the witness's claim that the committee's interrogations were infringements
upon first amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court stated that investigations are
a part of law making and are justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process.
Investigations were recognized as being subject to the command that Congress
shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, press, or assembly, but it was
recognized that these cases involve a balancing of the interests of Congress in demanding disclosure and the individual's right to privacy and his liberty of speech,
press, religion or assembly.
The same year in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,10 the Supreme Court reversed
the contempt conviction of appellant arising from an investigation being conducted
by the Attorney General of New Hampshire as to subversive activities. Sweezy,
who was suspected of such activities, had refused to answer questions concerning
a lecture given by him at the state university. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, asserted, once more, that such questions called for a balancing of
the right of a citizen to political privacy, as protected by the fourteenth amendment and the right of the state to self-protection. He found that the interests in
7. United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 838 (1948); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948). The dissent expressed the view that the committee's investigation abridges freedom of speech and inflicts punishment without
trial.
8. 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).

9. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). The specific basis for the decision was that the
authorizing resolution of the House Committee on Un-American Activities was so
vague and the other methods for determining the subject under inquiry so inadequate that the witness was not accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether
he was within his right in refusing to answer. Consequently his conviction was held
to -be invalid under the due -process clause of the fifth amendment. On the problem
of propounding questions to a witness before an investigatory committee, see
Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Slagle v. Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961).
10. 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (concurring opinion). In this case a majority of
the Supreme Court held that the lack of any indication that the legislature wanted
the information, due to the broad enabling resolution, had to be treated as a lack
of authority by the Attorney General of New Hampshire to secure it.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
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academic and political freedoms protected by the first amendment outweighed the
state's interest.
Two cases involving the N.A.A.C.P. serve to point up a distinction drawn by
the Supreme Court in interpreting first amendment freedoms in those cases where
communist activities are not involved. In Bates v. City of Little Rock" and
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama 2 instrumentalities of the state had attempted to compel
disclosure of the names of members of the organization. The Supreme Court held
that the interest of the state must be compelling in order to overcome the individual's constitutional rights at stake. Here the Court felt that neither a municipality's interest in taxing nor a determination of whether petitioner was doing intrastate
business was a controlling justification for the abridgement of associational freedoms which disclosure would effect."3
Perhaps the case which most poignantly served notice to the public of the
dissension in the Supreme Court on the issue of the protections of the first
amendment was Uphaus v. Wyman.' 4 The Attorney General of New Hampshire in
the course of conducting a probe of subversive activities in the state called Mr.
Uphaus, Executive Director of World Fellowship Inc., a voluntary corporation
maintaining a summer camp in the State. Mr. Uphaus testified concerning his own
activities, but refused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum which required
the names of all persons who had attended the camp during the preceding two
years. On the second appeal to the United States Supreme Court of a contempt
of court judgment, Mr. Uphaus asserted that the state was precluded from compelling the production of the documents by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court, four Justices dissenting, affirmed, holding that
the state's interest in subversive activities which threaten the security of the
5
state outweighs the appellant's interest in associational privacy.' More controversy
was invoked when on a subsequent appeal from a judgment of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court holding that appellant remained in civil contempt despite the expiration of the law of New Hampshire authorizing the investigation, the Supreme
Court, three Justices dissenting, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, in
8
that the judgment sought to be reviewed was based on nonfederal grounds.'
7
In Barenblatt v. United States' the Supreme Court again had to decide
11. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
12. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
13. Accord, Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
14. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
15. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
16. Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388 (1960). Justice Black, in -his dissent,
voiced the opinion that the summary dismissal of this appeal, when the abridgement of right of free speech and assembly was so obvious, was an indication of
just how far the Supreme Court had already departed from the protections of the
Bill of Rights.
17. Supra note 5. Justice Black, in an eloquent dissent, declared: "Ultimately
all the questions in this case really boil down to one-whether we as people will
try fearfully and futilely to preserve democracy -by adopting totalitarian methods,
or whether in accordance with our traditions and our Constitution we will have
the confidence and courage to be free." 360 U.S. at 162 (dissenting opinion).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/10
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whether the first amendment to the Constitution prohibited a federal legislative
investigating committee from compelling a college instructor to answer questions
concerning his alleged membership in the Communist Party. In upholding a contempt of Congress conviction Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for a majority of the
Supreme Court, said:
Undeniably, the first amendment in some circumstances protects an individual from -being compelled to disclose his associational relationships.
However, the protections of the first amendment, unlike a proper claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment, do
not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where
first amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation
resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.18
There are at least two somewhat broad conclusions which can be drawn from
these cases. First, where first amendment rights are asserted to bar government
interrogations resolution of the issue by a majority of the Supreme Court has involved a balancing 'by the court of the governmental interest in conducting the
investigation and the individual's freedom of speech and association under the
first amendment. Second, the cases up to this time point to the fact that a majority of the Supreme Court takes the position that when the governmental interest
involved is in self-preservation through investigating subversion and Communist activity the scales will likely be tipped in favor of the governmental interest, but
when lesser governmental interests are involved such as taxation or business regulation the protections of the first amendment will be compelling.
The assertion has been made by a majority of the Supreme Court in these
cases, that under the Constitution, the national interest in political freedom may
be subordinated to the national interest in self-preservation. Mr. Justice Black has
brilliantly and cogently defended freedom under the first amendment in the
face of this assertion."S Others have asserted that the Constitution gives no such
status to the right of self-preservation as many of the opinions claim for it.
Further, the theory which asserts that constitutional values may be "balanced"
by the appellate courts is radically hostile, not only to the first amendment, but
also to the intent and provisions of the Constitution as a whole.2 0 In the midst of
these conflicting assertions it would seem to be of ultimate significance that we
recognize the community may as easily become unrestrained in its passion for
order, as may the various forces in the community for freedom. We must also
be aware of the fact that it is necessary to preserve a proper balance between
both principles, and to be as ready to champion the individual against the com18. Id. at 126.
19. Wilkinson v. United States, supra note 1 (dissenting opinion); Upbaus v.
Wyman, s-upra note 16 (dissenting opinion); Barenblatt v. United States, swl ra
note 17 (dissenting opinion).
20. Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-PreservationAgainst Political Freedom,
49 CALiF. L. REv. 4 (1961).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
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munity as the community against the individual. We should realize that any definition of the protection of -the first amendment is always colored to some extent by
the exigencies of the moment which may make the security of order seem preferable
to the peril of freedom. Thus the principles in these cases which set limits upon
freedom and order and determine the rights of an individual in our free society
must be subject to constant reexamination 21 It would seem that if ours is to remain an open society which encourages independence, unorthodoxy, and differences
the reexamination dare not be delayed.
EARL S. MACKEY

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWSSTATE ACTION VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Autkority'
By authority of an. act of the Delaware Legislature2 the Wilmington Parking
Authority was established. The Authority was granted the power of eminent
domain and immunity from taxation, and was endowed with other characteristics
possessed by governmental bodies. The purpose of the Authority was to provide
parking garages for downtown Wilmington, and toward that end the city provided
a grant with which to buy the needed land. The Authority sold revenue bonds to
finance the construction of a large parking garage. The planning indicated that
revenue from parking charges would be insufficient to pay off the bonds so a part
of the building was constructed to house four commercial concerns. Leases for this
area were granted on bids and Eagle Coffee Shops, Inc., became one of the Authority's four lessees. Eagle then equipped and opened a coffee shop in the parking building.
Plaintiff Burton, a Negro, was refused service in Eagle's establishment. He then
filed a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Chancery of Delaware and
judgment was rendered which forbade Eagle to discriminate against any person
because of race.2 The decision was based on the close connection between the
Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State of Delaware, and its lessee
Eggle, 'a connection which the court felt brought Eagle's action within the sphere of
that state action prohibited by the fourteenh amendment to the United States
Constitution.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware the decision was reversed. 4 The
21. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 78
(1944).
1. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 505-15 (1953).
3. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 150 A.2d 197 (Del. Ch. 1959).
4. Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/10
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court felt that the facts did not show such a relationship that Eagle's discrimination could be considered state action. The court also noted that Eagle's was an
establishment within the scope of a Delaware statute authorizing restaurant owners
and others to refuse service to persons offensive to the major portion of their
customers.5
Burton appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States; the appeal was
dismissed but the Court treated the papers as a petition for certiorari, which it
granted.8 In a six to three decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the Delaware court and held that Eagle's discrimination was violative state action under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Clark, who concluded
that a consideration of the facts showed a sufficient connection between Eagle and
the Authority to make the discrimination an act of the State. A number of factors
influenced this ruling: there was public ownership and dedication of the building;
a part of the money used for construction came from public sources; there was
public payment of costs of maintenance and repair; the areas leased were not
surplus State property, but were an integral part of the overall parking plan;
the improvements made by Eagle which became a part of the realty were not subject to State taxes; and profitable operation of the restaurant was indispensable to
the financial success of the garage. From these factors, Mr. Justice Clark concluded:
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the
Authority... indicates that degree of state participation and involvement
in discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.7
Mr. Justice Clark also mentioned a proposition which had not been considered
in the State courts. He placed some emphasis on the fact that the Authority
failed to require in the lease that Eagle give service without discrimination. It is
not clear that Mr. Justice Clark considered this factor decisive, for he discussed
it only briefly:
. . . [I]n its lease with Eagle the Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a consequence of state
participation. ... [N]o State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities
by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them ....

By

its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made
itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power,
property, and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that
it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity....s
In one paragraph Mr. Justice Clark not only reached the conclusion that,
because of the interrelationship between Eagle and the Authority, there was pro5. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 24, § 1501 (1953).
6. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra note 1, at 717.
7. Id. at 724.
8. Id. at 725.
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hibited state action, but proceeded to speak of the shortcoming of the leasing
agreement; he then asserted that through "inaction" the State made itself a party
to discrimination. It appears that the only inaction involved was the failure to
prohibit discrimination in the lease. It also appears that at the time Mr. Justice
Clark raised this matter, he had already disposed of the case. His opinion is confusing, to say the least, and conclusions are difficult to draw.
Quaere, is the language strong enough to conclude that if a state fails expressly
to prohibit discrimination in a lease when it can do so, this failure will cause the
state to be considered a "joint participant" in any resulting discrimination? Even
though the language standing alone might indicate that it would, Mr. Justice
Clark's closing comments cast some doubt on this conclusion:
Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the
conclusions drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record are by
no means declared as universal truths on the basis of which every state
leasing agreement is to be tested. . . Specifically defining the limits of
our inquiry, what we hold today is that when a State leases- public
property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been the case
here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied
with by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants
written into the agreement itself. 9
I. STATE AcTIoN IN GENERAL
The distinction drawn in Burton between private action and state action
originated with the Civil Rights Cases decided in 1883.10 In this series of cases the
Supreme Court invalidated certain federal statutes which proposed to regulate
discriminatory action in a wide range of conduct." The Court held that the
fourteenth amendment could reach only that discriminatory action which could
be described as being state action, and that purely private discrimination could
not be controlled by Congress and was not forbidden by the Constitution.
The distinction between state and private action has been faithfully adhered
to by the Court, at least on a verbal level, but the sphere of state action has gradually been expanded to reach situations which might at first appear outside it.
It is apparent that state acton would include any act by any agency of a state,' 2
and at any level of government.' 3 It also includes acts of any executive officeri-h
w
5
held that acts of the State judiciary in enforcing private
Shelly v. Kraemer
agreements
which were valid under the State common law could be
discriminatory
violative state action. Legislative enactments'8 and municipal ordinances'7 are

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 725-26.
109 U.S. 3.
Civil Rights Act of 1883, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 335.
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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within the scope of state action, as is private action that results from mandatory
state statutes.18 Also within the area described by the courts as state action, is
action under valid state laws which are improperly enforced. Acts and ordinances
which appear to be nondiscriminatory may be enforced unequally and this
constitutes state action. 19 Conduct of state officers contrary to law may be
violative of the amendment's provision, the courts holding that inasmuch as the
officer is in a position to act because of state-granted authority, his acts have
the appearance of state action. 20 Inaction by a state may also be constitutionally
prohibited, as well as action by lessees of a state, as indicated by the Burton
case. 21 The constitutional limitations may apply to actions of private organizations if they receive state aid, which is usually in the form of financial support.Also, if a private organization performs quasi-governmental functions, though
without state aid, such as holding primary or pre-primary elections, its discrimination will not be considered private.2 3
II. THE LEASE CASES
Initially it should be asked if there can be gleaned from the varied holdings
in this area, a controlling principle which may be used as a general guide. After
considering the cases involving leases, Professor Thomas P. Lewis concluded that:
The view taken here, which the cases seem to support, is that the nature
of the function performed is the controlling factor. That the state is lessor
has significance because the circumstances bringing the lessor-lessee rela24
tionship into existence may indicate the nature of the function.
By looking to the "nature of the function performed," the cases which have
found a lessee's conduct to be violative state action seem more consistent. The
leases involved services which the government had a definite interest in providing;
none of the activities were completely independent of the normal governmental
operation. These cases dealt with such state services as swimming pools, 3 golf
courses, 26 state parks, 27 airport restaurants, 28 and courthouse cafeterias, 29 all of
which exist '%y virtue of governmental effort to serve a -public need or want ....-13
18. Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955).
19. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S.
370 (1880).
20. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
21. Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); Catlette v. United
States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
22. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
23. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
24. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L.REV. 1083, 1100 (1960).
25. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
26. City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957).
27. Tate v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va.
1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956).
28. Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
29. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 924 (1957).
30. Lewis, sWpra note 24, at 1100.
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Derrington v. Plummner3" illustrates this basis for decision. A space in the
basement of a courthouse, designed and equipped as a cafeteria, was leased to a
private operator who served whites only. The court found state action because of
the State's interest in providing restaurant services for users of the courthouse, and
because of State participation in building and equipping the cafeteria. The comment of the court as to the circumstances under which a state's lessee's action
might be private seems to indicate the general attitude of the federal courts.
... [WJhen there is no purpose of discrimination, no joinder in the enterprise, or reservation of control by the county, it may lease for private purposes property not used nor needed for county purposes, and the lessee's
conduct in operating the leasehold would. be merely that of a private

person ....32
Mr. Justice Clark cited Derrington v. Plumwmer in considering the Burton
case, but he avoided passing on the validity of this test by stating: "Assuming
that the distinction would be significant . . . the commercially leased areas were
not surplus state property . . . . ,3 Whether a lease of state property that could
fully meet the Derrington test would bring the lessee's acts within the concept of
state action is left uncertain.

III. STATE INActiON AND THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT
As mentioned earlier, the Burton case contains a discussion of the fact that
the Authority failed to place a prohibition on discrimination in Eagle's lease. The
view that inaction by a state under certain circumstances may be state action
within the purview of the fourteenth amendment is not novel, though at one time
it might have been:
There was a time when the denial of equal protection of the laws was
confined to affirmative acts, but the law now is that culpable official inaction may also constitute a denial of equal protection. 34
Inaction has been the basis for a number of decisions where there has been found
a clear duty to act. For example, in Catlette v. United States35 a police officer
failed to protect a prisoner from a mob and this was found to be state action. But
the courts have not yet found discriminatory state action merely because states
have not prevented discriminatory private action; although capable of doing so,
states have not been considered obligated to act in this area. Unless there has
been a clear duty to act, state inaction has not been forbidden3s
31. Supra note 29.
32. 240 F.2d at 925.
33. 365 U.S. at 723.
34. Lynch v. United States, supra note 21, at 479.
35. Supra note 21.
36. For other cases on the matter of inaction being a basis for state constitutional violations see, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938);
Lynch v. United States, supra note 21; Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d
240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); United States v. Given,
25 Fed Cas. 1324 (No. 15,210) (C.C.D. De. 1873).
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Applying the inaction test of the earlier cases, Burtoan does not seem to be an
appropriate situation for finding state action because of a failure to prevent
discrimination in the lease. The question turns on whether Eagle's discrimination
was state action in the first place. If it was, the courts can deal with it, without
regard to a failure to forbid discrimination in the lease. If Eagle's conduct was not
state action, it is difficult to find an affirmative State duty to forbid discrimination
merely because that could have been done. If Mr. Justice Clark's discussion of this
matter was pertinent to the outcome, a number of questions arise. Is the Court
saying that failure to forbid discrimination transforms Eagle's action into state
action? Has the Authority violated the fourteenth amendment, in the view of the
majority, by not placing a limitation in the lease? Must such a provision now be
included in every state lease? Is there now a requirement that states act whenever
they have the power to forbid discrimination?
IV. THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL SANCTION

An element which is often found in civil rights cases was not discussed by the
court. There was no direct judicial sanction of Eagle's action. Burton was not
arrested for failure to leave the restaurant, but rather he was the moving party,
seeking State protection of an alleged right.
While it. is arguable that the decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware
could be interpreted as leaving the parties without any judicial interference or action at all, the necessary result of deciding that Burton has no cause of action is
that Eagle then has judicial recognition of the right to discriminate.
If A is excluded from B's land solely on the basis of his color, he does or
does not have a cause of action. If he does not it is not because the law
has not spoken, but because it has spoken and said that B was within his
legal rights in excluding A. Is this a conscious adoption by the state of
B's conduct?3 7
However, the majority opinion does not hold the action of the Delaware court to
be a conscious adoption of Eagle's conduct so as to run afoul of the fourteenth
amendment.
V. TAE PROBLEM OF THE DELAWARE STATUTE
The three other opinions deal with the Delaware statute previously mentioned.
This statute, thought by the Delaware court to be merely a codification of the
common law, 38 states that:
No keeper of an inn, tavern, hotel, or restaurant, or other place of
public entertainment or refreshment of travelers, guests, or customers shall

be obliged, by law, to furnish entertainment or refreshment to persons
whose reception or entertainment by him would be offensive to the

major part of his customers, and would injure his business. 39
37. Lewis, supra note 24, at 1113.

38. Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton, scupra note 4, at 902.
39. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 24, § 1501 (1953).
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The statute is not an unusual one, but Burton was the first case to present a
statute to this effect to the Court. The Delaware court held only that as a
restaurant, the statute did not require Eagle to serve everyone.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart agreed with the result reached
by the majority, but felt that it should have been reached by the more direct
route of holding the statute, "as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court
of Delaware, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment." 40 Since the statute authorizes restaurant operators to discriminate against those whose reception or
entertainment would be offensive to the major part of his customers, and since
there is no showing in the record that Burton as an individual was such a person,
Mr. Justice Stewart concluded:
The highest court of Delaware has thus construed this legislative enactment as authorizing discriminatory classificationbased exclusively on color.

Such a law seems to me clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I think, therefore, that the appeal was properly taken, and that the
statute, as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, is
constitutionally invalid. 41 (Emphasis added.)
The Court has never taken the position that private discrimination, of any
kind, standing alone, was repugnant to the Constitution. Discrimination by a
state has been dealt with in many ways but private acts 'have not yet been
touched. While Mr. Justice Stewart is not suggesting that private discrimination
should be interfered with, he seems to say that for the State to authorize private
discrimination, a construction which he felt was given the statute by the Delaware
court, is unconstitutional. It must be kept in mind that all the statute in question does, on its face at least, is specifically authorize that which private individuals could already do under the common law-that is, serve only those whom they
pleased to serve. Mr. Justice Stewart would invalidate such a law, and herein may
lie the importance of the Burton case, for previous to this time such laws have
gone unchallenged.
Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker, dissenting, qualifiedly agreed with
Mr. Justice Stewart's view, but would have sent the case back for clarification.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his separate dissent, asserted that: "If my brother
is correct in so reading the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, his conclusion inevitably follows." 4 2- However, he felt that the basis for the Delaware deci-

sion was not sufficiently clear to allow a decision.
Mr. Justice Harlan began his dissent, in which Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred, by commenting on the majority opinion:
The Court's opinion, by a process of first undiscriminatingly throwing
together various factual bits and pieces and then undermining the resulting structure by an equally vague disclaimer, seems to me to leave com-

40. 365 U.S. at 727 (concurring opinion).
41. Id. at 726-27 (concurring opinion).
42. Id. at 727 (dissenting opinion).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/10

16

et al.: Recent Cases

1961]

RECENT CASES

pletaly at sea just what it is in this record that satisfies the requirement
of "state action." 43
As mentioned, he also found the basis for the State court's decision was too unclear
to render a decision but that:
If... the Delaware court construed this state statute "as authorizing
discriminatory classification based exclusively on color," I would certainly
agree, without more, that the enactment is offensive to the Fourteenth
Amendment. .... If, on the other hand, the state court meant no more
than that under the statute, as at common law, Eagle was free to serve
only those whom it pleased, then, and only then,
would the question of
"state action" be presented in full-blown form. 44
While there may be a philosophical distinction between the statute, which,
according to Mr. Justice Stewart, authorized discriminatory classification based
exclusively on color, and the common law, which authorized Eagle to serve whomever it pleased, it is difficult to find any practical difference. The chances are that
Eagle would not please to serve Negroes under either rule. The common law does
not establish any standards for the distinctions it authorizes. Presumably the owner
of the business is free to accept whoever he pleases, and his judgment is not
open to question by the courts. Discrimination there may be, but it is a private act.
VI. CONCLUSION

The concurring and dissenting opinions, in suggesting the invalidity of the
Delaware statute, may be indicating two possible lines of decision for the Court
to follow in future cases.
If the decisions follow the idea suggested by Mr. Justice Stewart, that states
may not specifically authorize discrimination by statute and that statutes as the
one in question do just that, then acts similar to Delaware's will be held invalid.
If the Court goes no further, there will presumably be little change in the right
of the property owner and businessman to choose his customers. He will be
neither authorized by statute, nor forbidden by statute, and the choices are within
his own discretion in accordance with the common law.
If the Court should go farther, in line with the reasoning of Shelly v.
Kraemer,45 and hold that states may no longer recognize in any way, private
discrimination based solely on color, then a basic change will be made in our
understanding of the rights of property owners. A right unenforceable in the courts
will be hardly any right at all, and if the courts must inquire as to the basis for
the discrimination, and disallow all those choices based solely on color, on what
grounds may choices be made? If this point should arrive, the distinction between
state and private action will be blurred so completely that for all practical purposes, the Civil Riglrts Cases will be overruled. But instead of Congress' protecting
43. Id. at 728 (dissenting opinion).
44. Id. at 729-30 (dissenting opinion).
45. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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civil rights by statute, the courts will protect civil rights by refusing to give any
sanction to the person discriminating.
With this possibility in mind, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Autkority casts
little light, but a long, long shadow 48
JOHN CuRns TINDEL

46. There are a number of cases, some of which will or others which may
be heard by the Supreme Court this term, which could clear up many of the matters
left unsettled by the various opinions in the Burton case: Briscoe v. Louisiana,
Garner v. Louisiana, Hoston v. Louisiana, cert. granted, 365 U.S. 840 (Nos. 61719, 1960 Term; renumber Nos. 26-28, 1961 Term), (disturbance of peace convictions for failure to leave lunch counters); Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d
341 (Md. Ct. App. 1961), appeal filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3006 (U.S. July 4, 1961)
(No. 71), (disorderly conduct conviction for failure to leave amusement park);
State v. Williams, 117 S.E.2d 824 (N.C. 1961), cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3008
(U.S. July 4, 1961), (trespass convictions for failure to leave lunch counter);
Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422, 171 A.2d 717 (Md. Ct. App. 1961), cert. filed, 30
U.S.L. WEEK 3081 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1961)(No. 287), (trespass convictions for
failure to leave amusement park).
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